Abstract. Intelligent systems often operate in a blend of cyberspace and physical space. Cyberspace operations-planning, actions, and effects in realms where signals affect intelligent systems-often occur in milliseconds without human intervention. Decisions and actions in cyberspace can affect physical space, particularly in SCADA-supervisory control and data acquisition-systems. For critical military missions, intelligent and autonomous systems must adhere to commander intent and operate in ways that assure the integrity of mission operations. This paper shows how policy, expressed using an access-control logic, serves as a bridge between commanders and implementers. We describe an accesscontrol logic based on a multi-agent propositional modal logic, show how policies are described, how access decisions are justified, and give examples of how concepts of operations are analyzed. Our experience is policy-based design and verification is within the reach of practicing engineers. A logical approach enables engineers to think precisely about the security and integrity of their systems and the missions they support.
Introduction
Cyber space and physical space are ever more intertwined. Cyber-physical systems, i.e., systems with tight coordination between computational and physical resources, operate in these intertwined worlds. Automatic pilots in aircraft and smart weapons are examples of cyber-physical systems where the capability to complete Boyd's observe-orient-decide-act decision loop [1] in milliseconds without human intervention is essential.
For commanders, fulfilling the missions entrusted to them is of paramount importance. As autonomous cyber and cyber-physical systems have by their very nature little, if any, human supervision in their decision loops, mission assurance and mission integrity concerns require that the trustworthiness of these systems be rigorously established.
A practical concern is how commanders and implementers will communicate with each other. Commanders operate at the level of policy: what is permitted and under what circumstances. Implementers are concerned with mechanisms. Our observation is that commanders and implementers communicate through descriptions of policy and concepts of operation. Our key contribution is a methodology for describing policies and trust assumptions within the context of concepts of operations. ...
Fig. 1. Concept of Operations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we informally describe the central elements of policy and concepts of operation that we wish to describe and justify rigorously. Second, we describe the syntax and semantics of our access-control logic. Third, we describe a hypothetical concept of operations, formalize its description, and provide a formal justification for its operations. Finally, we offer summary remarks and conclusions.
Elements of Policy and Concepts of Operation
Policies are principles, guides, contracts, agreements, or statements about decisions, actions, authority, delegation, credentials, or representation. Concepts of operation (CONOPS) describe a system from the user's perspective. CONOPS describe the goals, objectives, policies, responsibilities, jurisdictions of various authorities, and operational processes.
The elements of policy we are concerned with include: We conceptualize CONOPS as a chain of statements or requests for action. These requests are granted or rejected based on the elements of policy listed above. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . What Figure 1 shows is an abstract depiction of a CONOPS that has three or more principals or agents: P1, P2, and P3. Principals are entities such as subjects, objects, keys, tokens, processes, etc. Principals are anything or anybody that makes requests, is acted upon, or is used as a token representing a principal.
CONOPS begin with a statement or request s1 by P1. In the syntax of the access-control logic we introduce next, this is the formula P 1 says s1. Principal P2, is envisioned to receive the statement P 1 says s1, and within the context of jurisdiction statements, policy statements, and trust assumptions, P2 concludes s2 is justified. As a result of this justification, principal P2 transmits a statement P 2 says s2 to principal P3, who then reacts within the context of its jurisdiction and policy statements, and trust assumptions. We repeat this for all principals and processes in the CONOPS.
Within the boxes labeled Principal 2 and Principal 3 are expressions What the above expressions intend to convey is that based on: (1) the statements or requests s1 and s2 made by principals P 1 and P 2, and (2) the statements of jurisdiction, policy, and trust assumptions under which principals P 2 and P 3 operate, P 2 and P 3 are logically justified (using the logic and calculus we describe next) to conclude s2 and s3. As we will see after formally describing the syntax and semantics of our logic, the two expressions above have the form of derived inference rules or theorems in our calculus. Each step of a CONOPS expressed in this fashion is a theorem justifying the behavior of a system. One of the principal values of using the access-control logic is the evaluation of a CONOPS for logical consistency within the context of given policies, certifications, and trust assumptions. The process we outline here makes explicit underlying assumptions and potential vulnerabilities. This leads to a deeper understanding of the underpinnings of security and integrity for a system. This greater understanding and precision, when compared to informal descriptions, produces more informed design decisions and trade-offs.
In the following section, we define the syntax and semantics of the accesscontrol logic and calculus.
3 An Access-Control Logic and Calculus
Syntax
Principal Expressions Let P and Q range over a collection of principal expressions. Let A range over a countable set of simple principal names. The abstract syntax of principal expressions is:
The principal P &Q ("P in conjunction with Q") is an abstract principal making exactly those statements made by both P and Q; P | Q ("P quoting Q") is an abstract principal corresponding to principal P quoting principal Q.
Access Control Statements
The abstract syntax of statements (ranged over by ϕ) is defined as follows, where P and Q range over principal expressions and p ranges over a countable set of propositional variables:
Informally, a formula P ⇒ Q (pronounced "P speaks for Q") indicates that every statement made by P can also be viewed as a statement from Q. A formula P controls ϕ is syntactic sugar for the implication (P says ϕ) ⊃ ϕ: in effect, P is a trusted authority with respect to the statement ϕ. P reps Q on ϕ denotes that P is Q's delegate on ϕ; it is syntactic sugar for (P says (Q says ϕ)) ⊃ Q says ϕ. Notice that the definition of P reps Q on ϕ is a special case of controls and in effect asserts that P is a trusted authority with respect to Q saying ϕ. 
Semantics
Kripke structures define the semantics of formulas. -W is a nonempty set, whose elements are called worlds.
is an interpretation function that maps each propositional variable p to a set of worlds.
is a function that maps each principal name A to a relation on worlds (i.e., a subset of W × W ).
We extend J to work over arbitrary principal expressions using set union and relational composition as follows:
where
] is the set of worlds in which ϕ is considered true.
] is defined inductively on the structure of ϕ, as shown in Figure 2 .
Note that, in the definition of
is simply the image of world w under the relation J(P ).
Inference Rules
In practice, relying on the Kripke semantics alone to reason about policies, CONOPS, and behavior is inconvenient. Instead, inference rules are used to manipulate formulas in the logic. All logical rules must be sound to maintain consistency. 
Modus Ponens
Rep Says P reps Q on ϕ P | Q says ϕ Q says ϕ
Fig. 4. Derived Rules Used in this Paper
Definition 3. A rule of form
The rules in Figures 3 and 4 are all sound. As an additional check, the logic and rules have been implemented in the HOL-4 (Higher Order Logic) theorem prover as a conservative extension of the HOL logic [2] .
Confidentiality and Integrity Policies
Confidentiality and integrity policies such as Bell-LaPadula [3] and Biba's Strict Integrity policy [4] , depend on classifying, i.e., assigning a confidentiality or integrity level to information, subjects, and objects. It is straightforward to extend the access-control logic to include confidentiality, integrity, or availability levels as needed. In what follows, we show how the syntax and semantics of integrity levels are added to the core access-control logic. The same process is used for levels used for confidentiality and availability.
Syntax The first step is to introduce syntax for describing and comparing security levels. IntLabel is the collection of simple integrity labels, which are used as names for the integrity levels (e.g., hi and lo).
Often, we refer abstractly to a principal P 's integrity level. We define the larger set IntLevel of all possible integrity-level expressions:
A integrity-level expression is either a simple integrity label or an expression of the form ilev(A), where A is a simple principal name. Informally, ilev(A) refers to the integrity level of principal A.
Finally, we extend our definition of well-formed formulas to support comparisons of integrity levels:
Informally, a formula such as lo ≤ i ilev(Kate) states that Kate's integrity level is greater than or equal to the integrity level lo. Similarly, a formula such as ilev(Barry) = i ilev(Joe) states that Barry and Joe have been assigned the same integrity level.
Semantics Providing formal and precise meanings for the newly added syntax requires us to first extend our Kripke structures with additional components that describe integrity classification levels. Specifically, we introduce extended Kripke structures of the form
where:
-W , I, and J are as defined earlier.
-K is a non-empty set, which serves as the universe of integrity levels.
-L : (IntLabel ∪ PName) → K is a function that maps each integrity label and each simple principal name to a integrity level. L is extended to work over arbitrary integrity-level expressions, as follows:
for every simple principal name A.
Using these extended Kripke structures, we extend the semantics for our new well-formed expressions as follows:
As these definitions suggest, the expression 1 = i 2 is simply syntactic sugar for
Reflexivity of ≤i ≤i
Fig. 5. Inference rules for relating integrity levels
Logical Rules Based on the extended Kripke semantics we introduce logical rules that support the use of integrity levels to reason about access requests. Specifically, the definition, reflexivity, and transitivity rules in Figure 5 reflect that ≤ i is a partial order. The fourth rule is derived and convenient to have.
Expressing Policy Elements in the Logic
With the definition of the syntax and semantics of access-control logic, we provide an introduction to expressing key elements of policy.
Statements and requests Statements and requests are made by principals. Requests are logical statements. For example, if Alice wants to read file foo, we represent Alice's request as Alice says read, f oo . We interpret read, f oo as "it would be advisable to read file foo."
Credentials or certificates are statements, usually signed with a cryptographic key. For example, assume we believe public key K CA is the key used by certificate authority CA. With this belief, we would interpret a statement made by K CA to come from CA. In particular, if K CA says (K Alice ⇒ Alice), we would interpret this public key certificate signed by K CA as having come from CA.
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction statements identify who or what has authority, specific privileges, powers, or rights. In the logic, jurisdiction statements usually are controls statements. For example, if Alice has the right to read file foo, we say Alice controls read, f oo . If Alice has read jurisdiction on foo and Alice requests to read foo, then the Controls inference rule in Figure 4 allows us to infer read, f oo is a sound decision, i.e., Alice controls read, f oo Alice says read, f oo read, f oo .
Controls statements are also statements of trust. Suppose CA is recognized as the trusted authority on public-key certificates. If CA says (K Alice ⇒ Alice) then we believe that K Alice is Alice's public key. An important consideration is that trust is not all or nothing in our logic. A principal may be trusted on some things but not others. For example, we may trust CA on matters related to Alice's key, but we may not trust CA on saying whether Alice has write permission on file foo. Essentially, the scope of trust of a principal is limited to the specific statements over which a principal has control.
Proxies and delegates Often, principals who are the sources of requests or statements, do not in fact make the statements or requests themselves to the guards protecting a resource. Instead, something or somebody makes the request on their behalf. For example, it is quite common for cryptographic keys to be used as proxies, or stand-ins, for principals. In the case of certificate authority CA, we would say K CA ⇒ CA. If we get a certificate signed using K CA , then we would attribute the information in that certificate to CA. For example, using the Derived Speaks For rule in Figure 4 we can conclude that certificate authority CA vouches for K Alice being Alice's public key:
In situations where delegates are relaying orders or statements from their superiors, we typically use reps formulas. For example, say Alice is Bob's delegate on withdrawing funds from account 1 and depositing funds into account 2 . If we recognize Alice as Bob's delegate, we would write:
Alice reps Bob on ( withdraw $10 6 , account1 ∧ deposit $10 6 , account2 ).
From the semantics of reps, if we recognize Alice as Bob's delegate, in effect we are saying that Alice is trusted on Bob stating that he wishes a million dollars to be withdrawn from account 1 and deposited into account 2 . If Alice says Bob says withdraw a million dollars from account 1 and deposit it into account 2 , we will conclude that Bob has made the request. Using the Rep Says rule in Figure 4 we can conclude:
Alice reps Bob on ( withdraw $10 6 , account1 ∧ deposit $10 6 , account2 ) Alice | Bob says ( withdraw $10 6 , account1 ∧ deposit $10 6 , account2 )
Bob says ( withdraw $10 6 , account1 ∧ deposit $10 6 , account2 ).
An Extended Example
In this section we describe a hypothetical example CONOPS for joint operations where Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTACs) on the ground identify targets and request they be destroyed. Requests are relayed to a theater command authority (TCA) by controllers in Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. If approved by commanders, AEW&C controllers direct aircraft to destroy the identified target. To avoid threats due to compromised communications and control, the CONOPS specifies the use of a mission validation appliance (MVA) to authenticate requests and orders. What follows is a more detailed informal description of the scenario followed by a formalization and analysis of the CONOPS.
Scenario Description
The sequence of requests and approvals is as follows: Threat Avoidance For mission security and integrity, JTACs, AEW&C controllers, pilots, and TCAs use a mission validation appliance (MVA) to request, transmit, authenticate, and authorize air strikes. MVAs are envisioned to be used as follows:
1. JTACs will use MVAs to transmit air strike requests to AEW&C controllers. 
Security and Integrity Requirements
The CONOPS for using MVAs must meet the following security and integrity requirements.
-All requests, commands, and approvals must be authenticated. No voice communications will be used. This includes at a minimum:
• All personnel are to be authenticated into mission roles, i.e., joint terminal air controller (JTAC), airborne early warning and controller (AEW&C) controller, pilot, theater command authority (TCA) , and security officer (SO).
• All communications, commands, and approvals are to be encrypted and signed for integrity. -All aircraft pilots receive their directions from AEW&C controllers and can only act with the approval of the TCA. -All keys, certificates, and delegations, i.e., the foundation for trust, must be protected from corruption during operations. Only personnel with proper integrity levels are allowed to establish or modify the foundation of trust. Controller says (JT AC says strike, target ) 
An Example CONOPS
MVA Use Cases We consider two use cases. The first use case shows how MVAs are used when an air strike is requested by a JTAC. The second use case shows how MVAs are used when a TCA orders an air strike. Figure 6 illustrates the flow of requests starting from Alice as JTAC, through Bob as Controller, resulting in an authenticated request to Carol as TCA. The process starts with Alice using her token T oken Alice to authenticate herself and her request to the JTAC MVA. The JTAC MVA authenticates Alice and her role, and relays Alice's request using its key, K JTAC-MVA to the Controller MVA. The Controller MVA authenticates the JTAC MVA and presents the authenticated request to Bob. Should Bob decide to pass on Alice's request, he uses his token to authenticate himself to the Controller MVA, which relays his request to the TCA MVA, which presents the authenticated request to Carol, a Theater Command Authority. Table 1 lists the formal representation of each request, relayed request, and authenticated request in Figure 6 . Figure 7 shows a similar flow of orders starting from Carol as TCA, through Bob as Controller, resulting in an authenticated order to Dan as Pilot. Carol authenticates herself to the TCA MCA using her token. Her orders are relayed to Bob. When Bob decides to pass on the order to Dan, he does so by authenticating himself to the Controller MVA, which relays to orders to Dan via the Pilot MVA. The formulation of each order and relayed order is shown in Table 2 . Controller says (T CA says strike, target ) Figure 8 and formulated in Table 3. 1. A person authenticates herself and claims a role using a token. Acting in a role, the person makes a statement (request or order). The first MVA, MVA 1, authenticates both the person and the role, and then relays the statement using its key to the second MVA, MVA 2. 2. MVA 2 authenticates MVA 1 and the role it is serving, then passes the statement up to the person using MVA 2.
Given the repeated pattern, we prove two derived inference rules (MVA 1 and MVA 2 ) that justify the behavior of MVA 1 and MVA 2. Auth There are two integrity levels: L op and L Sec , where L op ≤ i L Sec . All certificates have an integrity level L Sec , i.e., ilev(cert) = i L Sec . Table 5 show the integrity level and certificate access rights for each role. Strict integrity is satisfied as only the security officer SO (with the same integrity level L Sec as certificates) can install or write certificates into MVAs. Every other role is at the L op level and can only read certificates.
Installing K SO Establishing the basis for trust in MVAs starts with the installation of the Security Officer's key, K SO . This is assumed to be done by controlled physical access to each MVA that is deployed. Once the Security Officer's key is in place, the certificates that an MVA needs can be installed.
Certificate Installation Suppose Erica is acting as the Security Officer SO. The policy is that security officers can install certificates, if the SO has a high enough integrity level, and is given by ilev(cert) ≤ i ilev(SO) ⊃ SO controls install, cert .
Erica's authorization to act in the Security Officer role to install certificates is given by K so says Erica reps SO on install, cert .
This authorization is accepted under the assumption that K SO ⇒ SO and that the SO has jurisdiction, which is given by SO controls Erica reps SO on install, cert .
The proof for justifying Erica's capability to install certificates acting as a Security Officer, assuming her integrity level is L so is a straightforward application of inference rules described in Section 3.3.
Related Work
The access-control logic we use is based on Abadi and Plotkin's work [5] , with modifications described in [6] . Many other logical systems have been used to reason about access control. Some of them are summarized in [7] .
Our contribution is the methodology and application of logic to describe policies, operations, and assumptions in CONOPS. Moreover, we have implemented this logic in the HOL-4 theorem prover, which provides both an independent verification of soundness as well as support for computer-assisted reasoning.
